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Abstract
In aggregate U.S. data, exogenous shocks to labor productivity induce highly
persistent and hump-shaped responses to both the vacancy-unemployment ratio
and employment. We show that the standard version of the Mortensen-Pissarides
matching model fails to replicate this dynamic pattern due to the rapid responses
of vacancies. We extend the model by introducing a sunk cost for creating new
job positions, motivated by the well-known fact that worker turnover exceeds job
turnover. In the matching model with sunk costs, vacancies react sluggishly to
shocks, leading to highly realistic dynamics.
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The Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model has become the standard framework
for analyzing macroeconomic labor adjustment. Recent research has focused on the
ability of this model to explain various empirical facts about unemployment and job
vacancies.1 A largely overlooked question concerns whether the model can account
for the dynamic characteristics of labor market adjustment over the business cycle.
For example, aggregate employment is widely viewed as a lagging indicator of the
business cycle by policy makers and business analysts. Business cycles are also linked
to a characteristic pattern of unemployment and vacancy movements. As shown in
Figure 1, this pattern involves long counterclockwise loops in the space of vacancies
and unemployment, with the vacancy-unemployment ratio rising in booms and falling
in recessions.2
It is reasonable to imagine that the Mortensen-Pissarides model captures these
features of aggregate labor market adjustment, since it incorporates a sluggish labor
reallocation process that generates qualitatively plausible movements in unemployment
and vacancies.3 This paper shows, however, that the model in its standard form cannot
account for the cyclical pattern of unemployment and vacancies when calibrated to
U.S. data, nor can it capture the associated dynamics of employment adjustment.
Modifying the model by introducing a sunk cost for the creation of new job positions,
1For example, recent papers by Costain and Reiter (2005), De Bock (2005), Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2005), Krause and Lubik (2004), Hall (2005), Rudanko (2005), Shimer (2005) and Silva
and Toldeo (2005) evaluate the model's ability to account for the volatility of unemployment and va-
cancies given plausible shocks to labor productivity, while Bastos (2004), Fujita (2003), Fujita (2004),
Menzio (2004) and Yashiv (2005) consider other aspects of the model. See also Cole and Rogerson
(1999) and Mortensen (1994).
2The negative empirical relationship between unemployment and vacancies is known as the Bev-
eridge curve in recognition of the contribution of W.H. Beveridge. For a background discussion on
the Beveridge curve, see Abraham (1987), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Jackman, Layard, and
Pissarides (1989) and the references therein. Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997) provide an updated em-
pirical evaluation of the Beveridge curve. In this paper we focus on the dynamic characteristics of
vacancy-unemployment relationship at business cycle frequencies.
3Pissarides (2000) (pp. 26-33) provides a qualitative analysis of the the dynamic properties of the
model.
1however, dramatically improves the performance of the model in matching the empirical
dynamics.
We begin our analysis by estimating a three-variable VAR at quarterly frequency for
the U.S. consisting of aggregate labor productivity, the vacancy-unemployment ratio
and employment. In the context of the matching model, the vacancy-unemployment
ratio re°ects the intensity of search activities in the matching market, and thus it in°u-
ences employment through match formation. Procyclical movements in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio capture the adjustment pattern depicted in Figure 1. This speci¯-
cation allows us to trace the dynamic e®ects of labor productivity shocks on matching
intensity, as measured by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, and employment. Note
that in the context of the matching model, our identi¯ed cyclical productivity shock
can be broadly interpreted as resulting from impulses to demand or technology.4
The estimates reveal that the productivity driving process identi¯ed in our VAR
has a high positive correlation with matching intensity and employment at lags of 0-2
quarters and 1-3 quarters, respectively. Correspondingly, the impulse responses for the
two variables exhibit hump shapes, with matching intensity and employment peaking
after four and ¯ve quarters, respectively. In the period of the shock, matching intensity
jumps by about a third of the way toward its peak response, while employment does
not jump.
We next consider the ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides model to account for
these patterns. A discrete-time version of the model is calibrated to U.S. data, and
simulated data are obtained using a productivity driving process that approximates
the estimated process. The resulting dynamic correlations are sharply peaked at zero
lag, in stark contrast to the empirical correlations. The impulse responses derived from
the simulated data exhibit excessively large jumps in the period of the shock, and the
subsequent responses fail to capture the empirical hump shapes. Thus, the standard
matching model fails to capture the dynamic characteristics of the data.
The poor performance of the standard model can be traced to the rapid adjustment
of vacancies following a shock. Firms in the model incur vacancy posting costs only
on a period-by-period basis, and there are no other costs associated with creating job
4Shimer (2005) o®ers a similar interpretation concerning shocks to labor productivity.
2positions. Thus, they can respond freely to changes in productivity, causing vacancies
to closely track the driving process.
Evidence suggests, however, that job positions behave di®erently from vacancies.
Davis et al. (1996), for example, emphasize that jobs themselves are created and de-
stroyed at a rate substantially lower than the rate at which ¯rms open up and ¯ll
vacancies. This makes sense if ¯rms bear additional costs for creating job positions,
over and above the cost of posting vacancies. Such costs could tend to slow the adjust-
ment of positions in response to shocks, leading to sluggishness in vacancy adjustment.
To assess the importance of this mechanism for the dynamic performance of the
matching model, we extend the model in a simple way by introducing sunk job creation
costs. We assume that heterogeneous opportunities for creating new positions become
available each period. To exploit these opportunities, potential entrant ¯rms must pay
a sunk cost before they can post a vacancy. Positions created in this way remain active,
whether ¯lled or un¯lled, until they are eliminated by obsolescence. In particular, when
a worker quits, the ¯rm can post a vacancy to re¯ll the position without incurring
the sunk cost. This provides a meaningful distinction between job °ows and worker
°ows. Moreover, potential entrant ¯rms and ¯rms with established positions will have
di®erent incentives to post vacancies.
Simulated data from the calibrated sunk cost model reproduce the dynamic corre-
lations for matching intensity and employment with great precision. Impulse responses
exhibit realistic hump shapes, with the correct timing of peaks. The initial jump in
matching intensity closely matches the empirical estimate, while the counterfactual
jump in employment is signi¯cantly reduced relative to the standard model.
The superior performance of the sunk cost model is explained by the fact that
sunk costs cause vacancies to respond more smoothly following shocks. On impact,
the increase in vacancies is dampened due to the limited availability of opportunities
whose returns exceed the sunk cost. Since the shock persists, however, newly arising
opportunities will have pro¯tability above the steady state level in the periods following
the shock. This leads to further increases in vacancies, even as productivity decreases
toward the steady state. Similar reasoning applies with respect to negative shocks.
These smooth changes in vacancies underlie the realistic persistence exhibited by the
simulated data.
3Related literature. In their pioneering work, Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990)
study the dynamic adjustment of vacancies and unemployment using VAR models that
incorporate the labor force as a third variable. The impulse responses estimated by
these authors capture the hump-shaped responses of vacancies and unemployment, con-
sistent with our empirical analysis using the single matching intensity variable. Fujita
(2004) studies vacancy persistence using an identi¯cation approach that builds on the
method of Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990), and he shows that the Mortensen-
Pissarides model cannot generate realistic persistence. In the present paper, we utilize
a di®erent identi¯cation procedure, based on direct use of labor productivity data, and
we also consider employment dynamics. Further, we show that the de¯ciencies of the
model can be corrected by introducing a sunk job creation cost.
Fujita (2003), Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2004) and Yashiv (2005) consider
job matching models in which ¯rms bear costs for adjusting the stock of job positions.
In Fujita (2003), sluggish adjustment results from an initial job planning stage, while
Yashiv (2005) introduces sluggishness by means of a standard convex adjustment cost.
Neither of these papers considers direct costs of job creation, nor do they develop the
distinction between job °ows and worker °ows. Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2004)
focus on steady-state economic growth rather than cyclical adjustment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical
¯ndings from the estimated VAR. The standard matching model and the sunk cost
extension are developed in Section 3, and results are presented in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Cyclical shocks and adjustment
In this section we assess the cyclical characteristics of unemployment, vacancies and
employment for the U.S. between 1951 and 2004. The ¯rst step is to determine an
appropriate measure of cyclical shocks. Shimer (2005) has argued that average labor
productivity can be used as a cyclical indicator for purposes of evaluating the matching
model. This is compelling in that productivity incorporates a broad range of factors
that in°uence the returns to employment. Productivity can itself be in°uenced by the
labor market, however, so we must account for potential endogeneity in evaluating the
4e®ect of productivity on labor market variables.
We next specify an empirical relationship between productivity and the labor mar-
ket variables. A large body of empirical work has demonstrated that hiring °ows are
well approximated by a constant returns-to-scale function of unemployment and job
vacancies.5 This implies that hiring may be regarded as a function of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio. Thus, it makes sense to summarize the relationship between
unemployment and vacancies in terms of the vacancy-unemployment ratio; we refer to



























where lnzt, lnvut and lnempt denote the logs of labor productivity, the vacancy-




are the reduced-form residuals of the three equations; and A(L) is a lag polynomial
matrix, with A(0) being the identity matrix. Each variable is detrended by regressing
on Chebyshev polynomial time trends. The sample period is 1951:Q1 to 2004:Q3.6
To identify the exogenous component of productivity, we use the recursive ordering
lnzt, lnvut and lnempt, so that innovations to labor productivity are treated as exoge-
nous with respect to matching intensity and employment in the current quarter.7 The
5See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a detailed survey of research on the estimation of match-
ing functions.
6Labor productivity is measured as real GDP divided by civilian employment, 16 years and over.
For the vacancy-unemployment ratio, we use the index of newspaper help-wanted advertising divided
by the number of unemployed, 16 years and over. The employment-population ratio consists of civilian
employment, 16 years and over, divided by civilian noninstitutional population. Data were obtained
from the FRED II database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The sample period is
restricted by the availability of the help-wanted index. The model was estimated for all combinations
of lag lengths (up to four) and polynomial trends (up to fourth order). Based on the AIC, we choose
lag lengths of three quarters and third-order time trends in each equation.
7Our identi¯cation of cyclical shocks can be motivated by the reasonable restriction that innovations
to the vacancy-unemployment ratio should not have a positive contemporaneous e®ect on productivity.
Among the six possible orderings of the three variables, this restriction eliminates the three orderings
in which lnvut is ordered before lnpt. The results for the remaining three orderings are nearly
5exogenous productivity series, denoted by ln b zt, is determined by
b A11(L)lnb zt = b "
z
t; (2)
where b A11(L) is the estimated value of the polynomial in the ¯rst row and ¯rst column
of A(L) and b "z
t indicates the ¯tted residuals from (1). Note that (2) extracts the
exogenous cyclical component of lnzt by suppressing the feedbacks to productivity
from matching intensity and employment that are associated with the terms b A12(L)
and b A13(L) in the second and third columns of the ¯rst row of the matrix polynomial.
The conditional correlations of lnvut and lnempt with lnb zt at various leads and
lags provide a summary measure of the dynamic relationship between cyclical shocks,
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where b A2j(L) and b A3j(L) give the estimated values of the polynomials in the jth column
of the second and third rows, respectively.8 Figure 2 reports the correlations graph-
ically. Observe that matching intensity and employment are highly correlated with
lagged values of exogenous productivity, with peak correlations at lags of 0-2 quarters
and 1-3 quarters, respectively.
Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation productivity shock can be computed
by calculating the trajectories implied by (3). Results are reported in Figure 3. As
seen in the top panel, lnb zt jumps by about 0.7 percent as a result of the shock, then
returns monotonically to its steady state after oscillating slightly for two quarters.9
The dynamic pattern of unemployment and vacancy adjustment is captured in the
indistinguishable from one another. For concreteness, we focus on one particular choice from among
these three.
8Since the identi¯ed productivity shock b "z
t may have contemporaneous e®ects on the other two
variables in the structural form (3), the elements b A21(0) and b A31(0) may be nonzero, in contrast to
the restriction A21(0) = A31(0) = 0 in the reduced form (1).
9Note that the estimated impulse response for ln b zt is very close to the one generated by the
technology process lnzt = :95lnzt¡1 + "t, with ¾z = :007, that is standard in RBC analysis.
6middle panel as a hump-shaped response of the variable lnvut. Vacancies initially
jump relative to unemployment by about 5 percent. The vacancy-unemployment ratio
continues to rise rapidly for four quarters, with a peak at roughly 12 percent above the
steady state, after which it falls fairly rapidly for eight quarters or so. The variable
lnempt, in the bottom panel, does not jump in the period of the shock, but otherwise
its response closely mimics the response of lnvut, with a one-quarter lag and a peak
of about 0.35 percent above the steady state. This indicates that the adjustment of
employment is closely tied to the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies.
We now link these results back to adjustments of unemployment and vacancies
themselves. The matching intensity variable lnvut can be decoupled into separate va-
cancy and unemployment components by estimating a bivariate VAR in which the ¯tted
















where lnvact and lnunempt represent the logs of vacancies and unemployment, respec-
tively; "v
t and "u
t are innovations to these two variables; and B(L), C(L) and D indicate
a polynomial matrix, a polynomial vector and a real vector, respectively. Variables have
been detrended by regressing on Chebyshev polynomial time trends.10
Figure 4 depicts the responses of vacancies and unemployment to a one-standard-
deviation shock to productivity. Observe that vacancies and unemployment respond
in opposite directions, but by the same magnitude, in the period of the shock, with
vacancies rising by 2 percent and unemployment falling by 2 percent. The variables
move as rough mirror images of each other over the next 12 quarters, with unemploy-
ment decreasing at a slightly faster rate in the ¯rst year. The vacancy response peaks
at 5.5 percent in the third period following the shock, and the unemployment response
troughs at -6.5 percent in the fourth quarter. It follows that just under half of the
overall adjustment of matching intensity over the ¯rst 12 quarters is accounted for
by changes in vacancies. By the 13th quarter, vacancies have substantially returned
to their steady state, while unemployment maintains an extended gap of about one
10In this estimation we use lag lengths of three quarters and third-order time trends in order to
maintain consistency with the previous speci¯cation.
7percentage point below its steady state.
3 Matching Models
3.1 Standard model
Model description. In this section we present a version of the standard matching
model.11 The model consists of a unit mass of workers and an in¯nite mass of ¯rms. In
any given period, workers may be either matched with a ¯rm or in the unemployment
pool searching for a match. Firms are either matched with workers, in the vacancy
pool searching for a match, or in a pool of potential entrant ¯rms that are not actively
searching. Matched worker-¯rm pairs engage in production, while workers and ¯rms
in the matching pools seek to form new matched pairs. Potential entrant ¯rms may
choose to enter the vacancy pool in any period.
While in the unemployment pool, a worker receives a °ow bene¯t of b per period,
which may be interpreted as utility from leisure. Each ¯rm in the vacancy pool pays
a posting cost of c per period. The net number of new matches created in period t
is given by the matching function m(ut;vt), where ut and vt indicate the sizes of the
period t unemployment and vacancy pools, respectively. The function m satis¯es the
customary properties.12 A worker and ¯rm that are matched in period t begin a new
employment relationship in period t + 1.
At the start of period t, each worker-¯rm match undergoes two distinct separation
hazards. First, separation occurs with probability ¸d as a consequence of obsolescence.
In this case, the worker enters the period t unemployment pool and the ¯rm enters
the pool of potential entrants. Second, separation may occur for reasons that do not
11This is essentially a discrete-time version of the model described in Chapter 1 of Pissarides (2000).
In de¯ning the job separation rate, we introduce a distinction between permanent obsolescence and
quits, and we also distinguish between quit rates of newly formed and ongoing matches. These
distinctions are immaterial for the standard model, but they will play an important role in the sunk
cost model introduced in the following section.
12That is, m is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in each ar-
gument, and homogeneous of degree one. Further, m(0;vt) = m(ut;0) = 0 and m(ut;vt) · minfut;vtg
for all ut and vt.
8destroy the job, which we refer to as a quit. For continuing matches, quits occur
with probability ¸q, while they occur with the higher probability ¸n for matches that
were newly-formed in the preceding period; this re°ects the higher observed separation
hazards among low-tenure employment relationships. Following a quit, the worker
enters the period t unemployment pool and the ¯rm enters the period t vacancy pool.
Agents that enter the period t matching pools as a consequence of separation are eligible
to be rematched in period t.
If the worker-¯rm match survives the separation hazards, then the agents negotiate
a contract that divides the period t surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution,
where ¼ gives the worker's bargaining weight and the threat point is a quit. Given
that the worker and ¯rm agree to continue, the match incurs a °ow capital cost of
· and engages in production in period t. The output of the match is given by the
productivity level zt, which evolves according to a Markov process.
Equilibrium. Let µt = vt=ut denote the vacancy-unemployment ratio. For a worker




= m(1;µt) = p(µt),
where we have made use of the linear homogeneity of the function m. Let St indicate
the value of surplus for a match that survives the separation hazards in period t. A
worker in the unemployment pool receives the bene¯t b along with a proportion of the
surplus from any match made in in period t that survives into period t + 1. Thus,
the expected present value of current and future receipts for an unemployed worker is
given by







where ¯ indicates the discount factor.
Similarly, for a ¯rm that begins period t in the vacancy pool, the probability of









9and the expected present value of the ¯rm's current and future receipts is








Note that the ¯rm receives the outside option value Vt+1 only if separation occurs as a
consequence of a quit, whereas the worker receives Ut+1 after either obsolescence or a
quit. This follows from the fact that the job ceases to exist following obsolescence.
A job match that survives the separation hazards in period t obtains the following
expected present value:








Equilibrium surplus is thus de¯ned by
St = Nt ¡ Ut ¡ Vt: (7)
Because entry into the vacancy pool entails zero sunk cost, competitive pressure
from potential entrant ¯rms will drive the equilibrium value of a vacancy to zero, i.e.,










Equations (4) and (6)-(8) determine equilibrium paths of Ut, Nt, St and µt for a given
process zt. The equilibrium solution determines the law of motion for unemployment:
ut = ut¡1 + [¸
d + (1 ¡ ¸
d)¸
q](1 ¡ ut¡1) ¡ p(µt¡1)(1 ¡ ¸
d)(1 ¡ ¸
n)ut¡1: (9)
Vacancies adjust in each period in order to maintain the relationship vt=ut = µt.
3.2 Sunk cost model
Motivation. The standard model has the key property that ¯rms incur no costs to
create job positions. Thus, unmatched ¯rms are dissuaded from entering the vacancy
pool only by the posting cost c. Equivalently, every unmatched ¯rm has an implicit
position to ¯ll, and the model makes no distinction between the creation of positions
and the ¯lling of vacancies.
10Evidence on job and worker °ows, however, points to important di®erences between
job positions and vacancies. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), in particular, have
stressed that the rate at which workers move across jobs greatly exceeds the rate at
which ¯lled jobs are created and destroyed. This di®erence can be measured by com-
paring steady-state match separation versus job destruction rates. Drawing on several
sources of information, we calculate below that nearly 19 percent of employed workers
separate from their jobs over the ensuing quarter, while the rate of job destruction
itself is only about 8 percent per quarter. Thus, the \churning" of workers across ¯lled
job positions amounts to over 10 percent of employment each quarter.
Such large-scale churning stems from a strong tendency of employers to maintain
job positions when workers depart. Indeed, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) argue that
roughly 85 percent of quits are replaced, while Holzer (1989) ¯nds that ¯rms with
a higher rate of worker turnover tend to post vacancies at a higher rate. Evidently,
job positions become more valuable once they are created, indicating the presence of
sunk costs for job creation. It is therefore sensible to extend the standard model by
introducing sunk costs for creating new job positions. This modi¯cation leads to a
meaningful distinction between job and worker °ows, and also generates sluggishness
in the adjustment of positions that carries over to vacancies.
Model description and equilibrium. The standard model is augmented as follows.
At the start of each period t, a number of opportunities for creating new job positions
is randomly distributed among the potential entrant ¯rms. Each opportunity allows
an entrant to create one position by incurring a sunk cost of K. The positions di®er in
their attractiveness; for simplicity, we assume that heterogeneity of positions is re°ected
by di®erences in sunk costs. Let the continuous function F(K) give the total mass of
opportunities in a period that have sunk cost no greater than K.
When an entrant receives an opportunity, it observes the aggregate productivity
level for period t, and then chooses whether or not to create the position at a cost of
K. If it chooses to create the position, then it may enter the vacancy pool for period t;
moreover, it does not have to pay the sunk cost for this position in any future period,
whether or not it is matched with a worker. However, at the start of each period the
position becomes obsolete with probability ¸d, and it ceases to exist thereafter. If the
11entrant chooses not to create the position, then the opportunity becomes unavailable
in future periods.13
For the sunk cost model, the free entry condition (8) is replaced by
Vt = b Kt; (10)
where b Kt is the entry margin. Potential entrants with K · b Kt at the start of period
t will choose to enter the vacancy pool, while those with K > b Kt will choose to stay





The implied law of motion for vacancies is








Equilibrium paths of Ut, Nt, St, b Kt, vt and et are determined by equations (4)-(7),
(10)-(11), and the identity vt=ut = µt, given the zt process and the predetermined
variables ut¡1 and vt¡1. Vacancies become a state variable in this model due to the
fact that only ¯nitely many jobs can pro¯tably be created in any given period, even
though the value of an established vacancy is strictly positive.
3.3 Functional forms
We adopt the following functional forms. For the matching function we use the form






Since this function always lies below unity, it does not require truncation, in contrast
to the standard Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation. The stochastic process for productivity
13We do not model the determination of F(K), nor do we allow a ¯rm to hold its opportunity for
more than one period, for reasons of parsimony. Under these assumptions there is no need to keep
track of the distribution of available opportunities across potential entrants. Feedbacks between this
distribution and search activities represent a potentially important additional source of propagation
e®ects, however, as discussed in Conclusion.
12assumes the standard ¯rst-order autoregressive form:
lnzt = (1 ¡ ½)lnz + ½lnzt¡1 + "t,
where "t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ¾". Note that
the realization of "t is observed by all workers and ¯rms in the economy at the start of
each period t.
Finally, for the sunk cost model we take the opportunity function F(K) to be linear





Note that the standard matching model can be recovered as a limiting case by letting
K approach zero.14
3.4 Measurement and calibration
To evaluate the two versions of the matching model, we generate arti¯cial data that
conforms to the U.S. data considered in Section 2. Our identi¯cation procedure es-
tablishes a direct correspondence between the theoretical driving process lnzt and the
exogenous productivity component ln b zt. The theoretical matching pools vt and ut ,
however, do not represent represent end-of-period stocks, but rather cumulations of all
workers and ¯rms available for matching in period t. Measured end-of-period stocks
are obtained from the following formulas:
v
m
t = vt ¡ m(ut;vt);
u
m
t = ut ¡ m(ut;vt):
The variable ln(vm
t =um
t ) thus corresponds to the empirical matching intensity variable
lnvut. Finally, the measured employment level is
n
m
t = 1 ¡ u
m
t ;
14This may be seen as follows. For small values of K, in°ows of entrant ¯rms would be very large
if Vt were not close to zero. Such large in°ows would raise µt, however, and thereby drive Vt to zero.
Thus, Vt must be close to zero, and the standard free entry condition Vt = 0 must hold in the limit.
13and lnnm
t corresponds to the employment variable lnempt.15
We next summarize the calibration of the model at quarterly frequency; details of
these calculations are given in the Appendix, and the chosen parameter values are pre-
sented in Table 1. First, information from Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Anderson
and Meyer (1994) is used to construct estimates of quarterly separation rates for new
and continuing job matches. These are given by 42:12 percent and 12:79 percent for
the ¯rst and subsequent quarters of a match, respectively, giving an overall average
separation rate of 18:89 percent per quarter.
To measure quarterly job ¯nding rates we must account for the existence of workers
who are out of the labor force but still available for work. As argued in the Appendix, it
is reasonable to equate the number of such available workers to the number of o±cially
unemployed workers. Under this assumption, we can construct a monthly transition
matrix for workers between the states of employed at a new employer, employed at the
same employer, unemployed, and out of the labor force. This matrix yields quarterly
rates of transition from unemployment and out of the labor force to employment of
58:34 percent and 65:79 percent, respectively. The implied overall job ¯nding rate is
p(µ) = :6206 per quarter.
We next combine this job ¯nding rate with the vacancy rate estimated from the
Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) to obtain a vacancy ¯lling rate of
q(µ) = :8541 per quarter. From these estimates we calculate the value l = 2:413 for
the matching function parameter. Further, we can extract the obsolescence rate ¸d
by combining our estimated separation and vacancy ¯lling rates with the average job
destruction rate of roughly 8 percent per quarter, obtained from Faberman (2004).
This gives an estimate of ¸d = :063 per quarter. The associated quit rates for new and
continuing matches are ¸n = :382 and ¸q = :069 per quarter, respectively.
We adopt standard values for the parameters ¯, ¼, z, ½ and ¾z; see Table 1. To
select the parameters c, · and b in the standard model, we impose two restrictions
in addition to the free entry condition (8): per-period wages in the steady state must
15As a check on our calibration, note that the measured unemployment rate in the steady state is
um = :0996. This is a reasonable value, in view of the fact that under our calibration the worker match-
ing pool includes a group of out of the labor force workers equal in size to the o±cially unemployed
group.
14match the measured labor share of 65 percent; and the unemployment bene¯t must
amount to 65 percent of net match output, z¡·. Note that the latter value lies between
the values of 40 percent and 94:3 percent suggested by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2005), respectively, and close to the value of 75 percent proposed by
Costain and Reiter (2005). These restrictions yield the values c = :193, · = :293
and b = :460 for the standard model. For the sunk cost model, we use the free entry
condition (10) and the other two restrictions to pin down the parameters K, · and b for
given values of c. In turn, we choose c to match the standard deviation of ln(vm
t =um
t )
generated by simulated data to the standard deviation of the empirical variable lnvut.
The resulting parameter values are K = :682, · = :288, b = :463 and c = :183.
4 Results
The standard and sunk cost models are solved using the nonlinear global projection
method called the collocation parameterized expectation algorithm (PEA); see Chris-
tiano and Fisher (2000) for a general discussion of this method. Details of the procedure
are given in the Appendix. The second moment statistics of the model economies are
based on 500 simulated samples. Each sample consists of 400 periods, where the ¯rst
200 observations are ignored to randomize initial conditions, and the last 200 observa-
tions are used to compute the statistics.
4.1 Empirical evaluation
Dynamic correlations. Figure 5 presents the dynamic correlations of productivity
with matching intensity and employment, calculated from simulated data, for the stan-
dard and sunk cost models, along with the empirical correlations originally reported in
Figure 2. The productivity-matching intensity correlations generated by the standard
model, shown in the upper panel, exhibit an unrealistically sharp peak at zero lag,
and fail to capture the °atness of the empirical correlations between lags of zero and
two quarters. Further, as seen in the lower panel, the model makes the counterfactual
prediction of almost perfect contemporaneous correlation between productivity and
employment, and the correlations at lags of 2 and 3 quarters are too low. These results
15clearly show that the standard model does not generate realistic dynamics.
The sunk cost model, in contrast, yields correlation pro¯les that essentially dupli-
cate the patterns seen in the data: the simulated correlations are °at over the correct
ranges of lags, with the correct phasing. Notably, the sunk cost model does not produce
the sharp peaks at zero lag that are characteristic of the standard model. Quantita-
tively, the correlations of matching intensity with current and lagged productivity are
somewhat too high in the sunk cost model, as may be seen in the upper panel of Figure
5. The model produces a remarkably close match with the productivity-employment
correlations, however, as the lower panel shows.
Impulse responses. The de¯ciencies of the standard model can be further illus-
trated using impulse responses. Figure 6 overlays the model-based impulse responses
for a one standard deviation shock to productivity with the VAR-based impulse re-
sponses reported in Figure 3. The top panel shows the dynamics of our calibrated
productivity driving process in comparison with the estimated process. The middle
panel indicates the response of matching intensity. On impact, the simulated variable
ln(vm
t =um
t ) jumps upward by over twice as much as the estimated response. Following
this, it returns monotonically to the steady state. Thus, the standard model signi¯-
cantly overstates the e®ect of the shock on impact, and entirely misses the subsequent
hump-shaped response pattern. Re°ecting this behavior, the simulated variable lnnm
t
jumps upward by a large amount in the period of impact, and its subsequent upward
movements are slight and short-lived. While the presence of matching frictions intro-
duces some persistence into the employment response, the amount of added persistence
is quantitatively tiny in the standard model.
Impulse responses for the sunk cost model, together with the empirical impulse
responses, are graphed in Figure 7. As seen in the middle panel, the jump in ln(vm
t =um
t )
matches the empirical value closely, and the subsequent response also displays a realistic
hump-shaped pattern: matching intensity rises for four quarters, then returns to the
steady state. The third panel shows that the response of lnnm
t continues to exhibit
the counterfactual upward jump in the period of impact, but the size of the jump is
about half that of the standard model.16 Moreover, the subsequent dynamics closely
16Under our timing assumptions, the productivity shock induces a contemporaneous change in entry
16match the empirical hump shape. Overall, the sunk cost model does a much better job
capturing the dynamic characteristics of the employment adjustment process.
4.2 Analysis
Vacancy adjustment and new openings. The dynamic properties of the stan-
dard and sunk cost models are linked to the behavior of vacancies. This is illustrated
in Figure 8, which considers the vacancy adjustments associated with the calibrated
standard and sunk cost models. The upper panel depicts the impulse response of the
measured vacancy stock vm
t for a one-standard-deviation productivity shock, and the
bottom panel shows the corresponding net changes in the vacancy stock. The variables
are expressed as level deviations from their steady-state values.17
In the standard model, the vacancy stock spikes upward in the period of the shock,
and then decreases monotonically in tandem with productivity. This means the initial
large in°ow of vacancies is immediately reversed by out°ows, as the bottom panel
shows. Since there is no sunk cost for entering the matching pool, potential entrant
¯rms can freely alter their job creation decisions to compete away rents following a
shock. Consequently, the vacancy stock adjusts directly with productivity.
In the sunk cost model, the initial upward jump is much smaller, and vacancies
continue to rise for several periods following the shock. The bottom panel of Figure
8 shows how the increases in vacancies gradually diminish, in contrast to the abrupt
adjustment exhibited by the standard model. This smooth adjustment of the changes
in vacancies underlies the persistent responses of the vacancy stock, matching intensity
and employment exhibited by the sunk cost model.
Smooth adjustment arises because of the way sunk job creation costs a®ect the
responses of potential entrant ¯rms. The initial upward jump in vacancies following a
into the vacancy pool, and the job matches generated by these added vacancies are counted as higher
employment at the end of the period. The measured jumps in both matching intensity and employment
would be reduced by a measurement convention that incorporated some averaging of beginning- and
end-of-period levels.
17Other graphs in the paper are expressed as log deviations from steady-state values. In this
instance, considering level deviations allows us to decompose net vacancy changes into separate gross
in°ows and out°ows.
17positive productivity shock is limited by the availability of pro¯table opportunities for
creating new openings, re°ected in the opportunity function. Moreover, persistently
higher productivity pushes the equilibrium entry margin b Kt above its steady state
value. This raises the volume of new openings relative to the steady state, as may
be seen in (11), and leads to further increases in vacancies. As the entry margin
returns to the steady state along with productivity, the increases in vacancies gradually
diminish. Similar reasoning applies with respect to negative productivity shocks: lower
productivity drives down the entry margin and new openings, causing vacancies to
decrease for several periods following a shock.
The quantitative importance of new openings can be seen by decomposing the net























Observe that the net changes comprise gross out°ows due to obsolescence and hires,
together with gross in°ows due to repostings following quits and new openings. Figure 9
plots the impulse responses for these gross °ows, which make up the impulse response
for the sunk cost model shown in the bottom panel of Figure 8. The graph clearly
shows that vacancy adjustment is almost entirely driven by new openings and hires.
Further, the in°ows from new openings lead the out°ows from hires, as a consequence
of the matching process. In the four quarters following the shock, new openings in°ows
exceed hiring out°ows, accounting for the vacancy increases observed in Figure 8.
Empirical evidence. Although new openings play a crucial role in shaping vacancy
stock behavior in the sunk cost model, the available vacancy data do not permit a
direct empirical assessment of this role. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey
(JOLTS), however, does provide information about vacancy stocks, quits, layo®s and
hires for 2001:Q1 to 2005:Q1, and this allows us to obtain an indirect measure of new
openings via the following stock-°ow relationship:
vact = (1 ¡ ¸
d)vact¡1 + quitst ¡ hirest + et: (14)
18Our analysis of steady state separation rates suggests that ¸d = :063 provides a rea-
sonable estimate of the vacancy withdrawal rate. We can combine this ¯gure with the
JOLTS data to impute an estimate of et from (14).
Consider the ¯rst quarter of 2001, which we view as the most typical within the
limited JOLTS sample. For this quarter, the ratio of cumulative hires to end-of-quarter
vacancy stock is about 3.5. Our imputed in°ow of new vacancies amounts to 1.5 times
the end-of-quarter stock. Thus, new openings amount to nearly half of total hires
within the quarter. Figure 10 plots indices of imputed new openings, vacancies, hires
and quits, treating 2001:Q1 as the base period. The four series °uctuate by comparable
amounts over the sample period, and, in particular, new openings exhibit signi¯cant
variability. Moreover, new openings move strongly upward in 2003:Q2, leading the
upward movement of vacancies by four quarters. The upward movements of hires and
quits lag those of new openings and are less steep. Based on this limited evidence, it
appears that new openings adjust sooner and by a greater magnitude in comparison
with the other components.
4.3 Ampli¯cation of shocks
Recent literature has focused on the ability of the matching model to amplify produc-
tivity shocks in order to explain the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. This
question may be addressed using our calibrations of the standard and sunk cost models.
Table 2 presents the standard deviations of matching intensity, employment, vacancies
and unemployment obtained from the detrended data, along with corresponding mea-
surements from simulated data for the standard and sunk cost models. The standard
deviation of the productivity process is 0:019 in all three cases.
Under the calibrated parameter values, the volatilities in the standard model exceed
the empirical levels for all variables except unemployment. As for the sunk cost model,
recall that our calibration procedure matches the standard deviation of ln(vm
t =um
t ) to
that of lnvut. The standard deviations of the four variables are all lower than those
of the standard model, but employment and vacancies remain somewhat more volatile
than in the data.
Shimer (2005) shows that the ampli¯cation of productivity shocks is sensitive to
19the value of b, with larger values of b leading to greater ampli¯cation. To assess the
sensitivity of ampli¯cation under our calibration, we reevaluate the standard model
using Shimer's suggested value of b = :40, with the other parameters adjusted to
maintain the calibration requirements.18 Under the alternative parameter values, the
volatility of matching intensity is reduced to 0.199 from 0.363. Broadly speaking, our
results thus con¯rm that the matching model may generate insu±cient volatility of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio, but the ampli¯cation mechanism is not nearly so weak
as suggested by Shimer (2005).
5 Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the cyclical dynamics of job matching intensity, as mea-
sured by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, and employment, where business cycles are
driven by exogenous shocks to labor productivity. The two variables respond to shocks
in similar ways, with employment responses lagging matching intensity responses by
one quarter. Both variables display the \hump-shaped" dynamics that are commonly
observed throughout the empirical business cycle literature.
We show that the standard matching model, as exempli¯ed by Pissarides (2000,
ch. 1), cannot account for the observed dynamic patterns. Because potential entrant
¯rms are able to respond easily to shocks, the vacancy pool adjusts in tandem with
productivity. As a consequence, most of the adjustment of matching intensity and
employment occurs in the period of the shock, leading to counterfactual dynamic cor-
relations and impulse responses. Introducing a sunk cost for creating job positions
causes the stock of vacancies to adjust sluggishly, leading to realistic dynamic behav-
ior. Our results suggest that sunk job creation costs may play a central role in explain-
ing cyclical adjustment. Moreover, the modi¯ed matching model can generate highly
realistic employment dynamics without resort to any kind of consumption-smoothing
mechanism.
The paper has relied on a number of simplifying assumptions that we believe are
worth evaluating in future research. First, the arrival of new opportunities for creating
18In particular, · and c have been changed to .245 and .352, respectively, while the other parameters
remain the same.
20job openings is taken to be exogenous and constant across periods. A more complete
theoretical model would tie this distribution to underlying investments made by ¯rms
(e.g., in physical capital or R&D). This creates further possibilities for longer-run feed-
backs from the labor market to productivity that might serve as important additional
sources of propagation. Relatedly, the assumed equivalence of newly-created and pre-
existing job positions can be modi¯ed by incorporating a vintage structure, whereby
new jobs enjoy higher productivity. This permits the endogenous obsolescence of jobs
and the turnover of workers to be considered as separate °ows within a common frame-
work.19 Finally, we have ignored the e®ects of cyclical variation in the relative sizes of
the pools of unemployed workers and workers out of the labor force but available for
work, and in the °ows between these pools. Changes in the characteristics of the lat-




Separation rates. The monthly average separation rate for job matches can be cal-
culated as the average of monthly out°ows from job matches divided by total employ-
ment. Monthly out°ows consist of worker transitions to new job matches, unemploy-
ment, and out of the labor force. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) have recently provided
measures of aggregate U.S. stocks and °ows of workers, derived from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) for 1994 and 1996-2003, that include these three transitions. The
numbers reported by Fallick and Fleischman imply out°ows from unemployment that
are inconsistent with steady state, so we adjust them slightly to achieve consistent
steady-state °ows and stocks. Adjusted °ows and stocks are reported in Table 3. The
19Aghion and Howitt (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998),
for example, analyze endogenous obsolescence in models that combine embodied technological progress
with search/matching frictions. None of those papers distinguish between worker and job turnover. In
recent work, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2004) adopt a speci¯cation similar to ours for purposes
of analyzing the unemployment experiences of the U.S. and Europe. They focus on comparison of
steady states, however, rather than cyclical adjustment.
21units represent percentages of noninstitutional civilian population aged 16 and over.
Observe that 4.15 new matches are created each month, while total employment is
63.15; thus, the implied steady-state separation rate is 4:15=63:15 = :0674 per month.
This ¯gure is roughly corroborated by Anderson and Meyer (1994), who consider
a large panel of workers derived from U.S. state unemployment insurance records for
1978-1984. In their sample, 17.23 percent of job matches experience a permanent
separation each quarter, which translates into an average monthly separation rate of
.0611.
Anderson and Meyer (1994) also ¯nd that 43.42 percent of job matches observed
during a quarter have duration of less than one year, which cannot hold unless these
newer matches experience separation at rates in excess of .0611. We incorporate this
fact in a parsimonious way by specifying a higher separation rate in the ¯rst month of
a match.20 We calculate values for monthly separation rates in the ¯rst and subsequent
months such that, in the steady state, 43.42 percent of matches have duration of less
than one year when the °ow of new matches is 4.15 per month. This yields monthly
separation rates of .3663 and .0446 in the ¯rst and subsequent months, respectively,
which translate into quarterly separation rates in the ¯rst quarter and subsequent
quarters as follows:
¸
d + (1 ¡ ¸
d)¸
n = :4212; (15)
¸
d + (1 ¡ ¸
d)¸
q = :1279: (16)
Job ¯nding and vacancy ¯lling rates. As seen in Table 3, a signi¯cant number of
workers °ow directly into employment from out of the labor force each month. Thus,
our measurements must account for a pool of workers who are out of the labor force
but still available for work. Since a total of 2.45 workers °ow into the labor force each
month, there must be at least this many available workers at the start of the month.
Further, assume that proportion ! of the workers who remain out of the labor force
20This calibration procedure matches the distribution of employment durations, but not the
duration-speci¯c survival probabilities, since separations are crowded into the ¯rst month. Fitting
the survival probabilities would require match-speci¯c separation rates, and the number of categories
of employed workers would correspondingly expand. In this paper we have opted instead for the
simplest speci¯cation that allows new matches to separate at a higher rate.
22at the end of the month are also available, corresponding to those whom the CPS
records as not engaging in search activity but still willing to take a job if contacted
by a searching ¯rm. Evidence from the 1994 CPS, discussed in Castillo (1998, p. 36),
indicates that this group amounts to anywhere between 22.5 and 77.5 percent of the
o±cially unemployed population, yielding a range of ! between .025 and .085. We
settle on the value of ! that equates the number of o±cially unemployed workers to
the number of available workers, i.e., 3:4 = 2:45 + 31!, or ! = :0306.
Monthly steady-state transition rates for newly separated, unemployed and avail-
able workers into new employment, unemployment and out of the labor force may be
calculated from Table 3. For example, monthly job ¯nding rates for newly separated,
unemployed, and available workers are 1.6/4.15 = .386, .85/3.4 = .25 and 1.7/3.4 = .5,
respectively. To calculate quarterly transition rates, we construct a monthly transition
matrix for the worker states of employed at new employer, employed at same employer,
unemployed, and out of labor force but available. Using this matrix, we calculate that
a worker who begins the quarter in the unemployed state will end the quarter in one
of the two employed states with probability .5834. The corresponding ¯gure for an
available worker is .6579. Averaging over unemployed and available workers gives an
overall job ¯nding rate of p(µ) = :6206 per quarter. Using this job ¯nding rate to-
gether the total separation rates for new and established matches, i.e., ¸d +(1¡¸d)¸n
and ¸d + (1 ¡ ¸d)¸q, respectively, in the steady-state °ow balance equation for un-
employment, we can determine the steady-state unemployment rate in the model u.
This allows us to obtain the number of matches from m = p(µ)u and the measured
unemployment rate um = u ¡ m.
Next we use evidence from JOLTS to determine the vacancy ¯lling rate q(µ). JOLTS
measures the vacancy rate as follows:
vac rate =
vm
1 ¡ um + vm:
According to the JOLTS, the monthly average level of the vacancy rate is 2.5 percent
over the period of December 2000 through May 2005. Given the widely-recognized
weakness of the U.S. labor market between 2001 and 2003, the average vacancy rate
over the longer horizon is likely to have been somewhat greater. We therefore set
vac rate = :03. Using this evidence together with the previously calculated value for
23um allows us to solve the above equation for vm, and from this we obtain q(µ) =
m
v = m
vm+m = :8541. Having determined the steady-state values of u, v and m, the
e±ciency parameter of the matching function l is solved using the matching function,
yielding l = 2:413. Furthermore, using the numerical values for ¸d, ¸q, u, v and q (µ)
in the steady-state version of the law of motion for vacancies (12), we can calculate the
steady-state value for new openings e = :058.
Job °ows. In the sunk cost model, we need to distinguish the obsolescence rate ¸d
from the quit rates ¸n and ¸q.21 To pin down these three parameters, we combine the
worker turnover rates with the job °ow rates reported by the Business Employment
Dynamics (BED) statistics. According to Faberman (2004), the quarterly job °ow
rates in the private sector averaged around 8 percent over the period 1990 through
2003. We equate this measured job destruction rate to the corresponding magnitude
in the model:
¸













The ¯rst term on the left-hand side measures job obsolescence, while the second term
re°ects jobs that become vacant as a result of quits, and remain vacant at the end of the
period. Since job destruction in the BED is computed from employment changes over
a quarter, both sources of employment change must be included. Using the previously
determined values of q(µ), u, and m, equations (15), (16), and (17) may be solved for
the values ¸d = :063, ¸n = :382 and ¸q = :069.
Other parameters. We adopt the standard values ¯ = :99 and ¼ = :50 for the
discount factor and worker bargaining weight. Productivity is normalized by setting
z = 1, and the parameters ½ and ¾" are selected to match the dynamics generated by
our Section 2 estimates.
For the standard model we make use of the value function equations (4)-(7) in the
steady state, together with the free entry condition V = 0, to specify the remaining
21In view of the free entry condition Vt = 0, the equilibrium conditions for the standard model are
in°uenced only by the combined separation rates ¸d + (1 ¡ ¸d)¸n and ¸d + (1 ¡ ¸d)¸q. Thus, we do
not need to separately measure ¸d for purposes of evaluating the standard model.
24parameters. The °ow posting cost c is determined by (8). The °ow capital cost ·is




d + (1 ¡ ¸
d)¸
q¤
¼S + (1 ¡ ¯)U = :65: (18)
The unemployment bene¯t b is selected so that b = :65(z ¡·), i.e., the unemployment
bene¯t is 65 percent of net match output. This lies between the values of 40 percent
and 94.3 percent suggested by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005),
respectively, and close to the value of 75 percent proposed by Costain and Reiter
(2005). This procedure yields the values c = :193, · = :293 and b = :460.
For the sunk cost model we must also specify the parameter K of the opportunity
function. For a given value of c, the parameters · and b are chosen to satisfy (18) and
b = :65(z ¡ ·), while K is chosen so that the free entry condition V = b K is consistent





It remains to specify the parameter c. There is little direct evidence as to the level of
°ow posting costs. The responsiveness of b Kt to changes in zt is highly sensitive to c,
however, so we use second moment properties of the model to pin down this parameter.
From the VAR model (1), the estimated standard deviation of lnvu, conditional on lnb zt,
is .299. Thus, we choose c so that the standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio, based on end-of-period stocks, in the simulated data lies as close as possible to
the empirical value. This yields the values · = :288, b = :463, K = :682 and c = :183.
The implied standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is .303. Table 1
summarizes the choices of parameter values for both models.
6.2 Solution Method
Standard Model. For the standard model, the aggregate state of the economy for
period t is a set of variables fmt¡1;ut¡1;ztg.22 We set the aggregate state space to
£
m¡
22Note that mt¡1 is in the set of period-t state variables because new matches and preexisting
matches are subject to di®erent separation hazard rates. In the sunk cost model below, vt¡1 is also a
























m and u are the steady-state values of the number of new matches and unemployment.
We parameterize the right-hand side of equations (4), (6) and (8) as a tensor product
of second-order Chebyshev polynomials of the three state variables. Note that each
function has 27 (= 33) unknowns, and thus there is a total of 81(= 27 £ 3) unknowns
to be determined.
Consider starting at an arbitrary grid point in the state space. For an initial guess
of the unknown parameters of the approximating functions, we use the unemployment
law of motion (9) to obtain the next period unemployment ut. Using the approximating
function for the right-hand side of the free entry condition (8) and the initial guess of its
unknown parameters, we can obtain vt. The ut and vt allow us to determine the number
of matches formed mt. Once we obtain the next period values of the state variables,
we compute the conditional expectations appearing in the value functions from the
distribution of the productivity shock ²t. The conditional expectations associated with
the productivity shock are computed via the Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 5 nodes.
The conditional expectations for each value function are evaluated at 27 grid points
that are chosen by ¯nding zeros of Chebyshev polynomials of each of the three state
variables, and taking all possible combinations of the zeros. The new set of coe±-
cients of the approximating functions are obtained by equating the right-hand side of
equations (4), (6) and (8) to the values of the approximating functions at the 27 grid
points. Since there are 27 coe±cients in each approximating function, this uniquely
pins down the new set of coe±cients. This process is iterated until convergence of
the 81 Chebyshev coe±cients is achieved. The convergence criterion is set to 10¡8. Fi-
nally, we simulate a long time series (200;000 observations) using the obtained solution
functions in order to check that the economy remains within the speci¯ed state space.
Sunk Cost Model. We solve the sunk cost model in a similar way. The period-t

























where v and u are the steady-state values of vacancies and unemployment. This time
we parameterize the right-hand side of equations (4), (5) and (6), again as a tensor
product of second-order Chebyshev polynomials of the state variables. Because there
26are three state variables and three functions to be parameterized, there is the same
number of unknowns (= 81).
Using the initial guess of the set of unknown parameters for the parameterized
equation (5), the entry conditions (10) and (11) pin down the entry level et at each
grid point. Using the law or motion for vacancies (12), we can then obtain the next
period value of vacancies vt corresponding to the initial grid point. The next period
unemployment ut is also obtained from equation (9). Given the distribution of the pro-
ductivity shock ²t, we can compute the conditional expectation of the right-hand side
of equations (4), (5) and (6). Each of the three conditional expectations is evaluated
at 27 grid points, and the new set of coe±cients is obtained by equating the right-hand
side of equations (4), (5) and (6) to the values of the approximating functions at those
grid points. The iteration process continues until convergence of the coe±cients is
achieved.
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30Table 1: Parameter Values
symbol description calibrated value
standard sunk cost
l e±ciency parameter of the matching function 2.413 same
¸d rate of obsolescence 0.063 same
¸n separation rate for new matches 0.382 same
¸q separation rate for preexisting matches 0.069 same
¯ discount factor 0.99 same
¼ bargaining weight of workers 0.5 same
z steady-state value of labor productivity 1.0 same
½ autoregressive parameter of lnzt 0.93 same
¾z standard deviation of the productivity shock 0.007 same
c °ow vacancy posting cost 0.193 0.183
· °ow capital cost 0.293 0.288
b utility from leisure 0.460 0.463
K slope parameter of the opportunity function n.a. 0.682
31Table 2: Volatilities
data lnvt=ut lnempt lnvt lnut







standard 0.363 0.0161 0.225 0.141
sunk cost 0.303 0.0134 0.181 0.119
Notes: Volatilities of the empirical data are conditional
standard deviations.
Table 3: Labor market transition matrix
End of Month
Es En U N
Start Es [ En 59:0 1:60 0:85 1:70 63:15
of U 0:95 1:70 0:75 3:40
Month N 1:60 0:85 31:00 33:45
59:0 4:15 3:40 33:45
Notes: Computed from Fallick and Fleischman, Table 2 (2001,
p11). Es: same employer, En: new employer, U: unemployed,
N: out of labor force. Out°ows from U in their table are
too large to be consistent with steady state. To adjust for
this, we subtracted 0:05 from U ! En °ows and U ! N
°ows, and added 0:05 to En ! U and N ! U °ows. Units
are percentages of civilian noninstitutional population aged 16
and over.
32Figure 1: Beveridge curve











































Notes: Quarterly averages of seasonally adjusted monthly data. The vacancy
rate is the number of newspaper help-wanted ads divided by the sum of em-
ployment and help-wanted ads. Sample period: 1951Q1-2004Q3.
33Figure 2: Empirical dynamic correlations






















Notes: Plotted are conditional correlations.
34Figure 3: VAR-based impulse responses to one-s.d. productivity shock
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Notes: Dotted lines are 90% con¯dence bands computed via Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations with 1;000 replications.
35Figure 4: Responses of vacancies and unemployment to one-s.d. productivity shock









36Figure 5: Comparison of dynamic correlations

























37Figure 6: Comparison of the impulse responses: standard model
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38Figure 7: Comparison of the impulse responses: sunk cost model
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39Figure 8: Vacancy responses
























Notes: Level deviations from the steady-state values.
40Figure 9: Gross °ows of vacancies in the sunk cost model


















Notes: Level deviations from the steady-state values. Out°ows
are plotted as negative values.
41Figure 10: JOLTS data






















Notes: New postings are imputed from the vacancy stock-°ow
relationship (14) using the JOLTS data on quits, hires and end-
of-the-period stock of vacancies, and the calibrated value of the
withdrawal rate ¸d. The above ¯gure plots the indices that treat
2001:Q1 as the base period.
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